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This Article reports the findings of an empirical study of patent 
suits involving non-practicing entities (NPEs) in the U.K. between 
2000 and 2010.  Overall, we find that NPEs are responsible for 
11% of all patent suits filed in the U.K. during this period.  Though 
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this is a small percentage by U.S. standards, our study suggests 
that patent trolling might not be as uniquely American as 
conventional wisdom suggests.  We also find little support for 
many common explanations for Europe’s relative scarcity of NPE 
activity.  For example, we find that NPEs litigating in the U.K. 
overwhelmingly assert high-tech patents—even more so, in fact, 
than their U.S. counterparts—despite higher barriers to software 
patentability in Europe.  Our study does, however, tend to support 
fee-shifting as a key reason for the U.K.’s immunity to NPEs.  We 
see evidence that the U.K.’s loser-pays legal regime deters NPEs 
from filing suit, while at the same time encouraging accused 
infringers to defend claims filed against them.  U.K. NPE suits are 
initiated by potential infringers more often than by NPEs; rarely 
end in settlement; very rarely end in victory for NPEs; and, thus, 
result in an attorney’s fee award to the potential infringer more 
often than a damages award or settlement payment to the patentee. 
Together, these findings tend to support patent reform bills 
pending in the U.S. that would implement a fee-shifting regime for 
patent suits, and may also serve to lessen concerns that Europe’s 
forthcoming Unified Patent Court will draw NPEs to Europe. 
INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom states that “patent trolls”—entities that 
obtain patents not to facilitate the development of new products, 
but instead for the purposes of suing those who do—are a uniquely 
American phenomenon.1  As the story goes, patent monetization is 
                                                                                                             
1 See, e.g., Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patents Enforcement: A Comparative 
Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in the US and Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 105), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156756 (“[P]atent trolls were believed to be almost exclusively 
confined within US borders . . . .  European countries appeared to be immune to the 
activity of NPEs.”); Anna Mayergoyz, Note, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. 
Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 244 (2009) (“Europe has remained relatively 
unscathed by patent trolls.”).  European policymakers, in particular, have been quick to 
characterize “patent trolls” as a problem unique to America and absent in Europe. See 
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, at 6, COM (2008) 465 final (July 16, 2008) 
(“The quality of patents in Europe is generally perceived to be high.  Nevertheless, 
stakeholders are concerned about maintaining and improving patent quality in 
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rarely pursued in Europe due to some combination of higher 
barriers to patenting software,2 steeper cost of enforcement,3 
                                                                                                             
Europe . . . . [because] [p]oor quality rights can also contribute to problems with ‘patent 
trolls’ that have arisen in the US judicial system”); Comments by Nuno Pires de 
Carvalho, Director, Intellectual Prop. & Competition Policy Div., World Intellectual 
Prop. Org (WIPO), Comments on PAEs’ Activities (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0007.pdf (“PAEs-
enforcers are a problem, if they can be deemed so, in the United States only . . . . 
[O]utside the United States to buy and hold patents with the mere purpose of enforcing 
them is not a financially wise decision.”); Gail Edmondson, European Patent Office 
Enters New Era: Managing the EU Unitary Patent, SCIENCE BUSINESS (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://www.sciencebusiness.net/news/76068/European-Patent-Office-enters-new-era-
managing-the-EU-Unitary-Patent (“‘I think patent trolls are linked to . . . injunction 
powers in the US legal system . . . . If we find a good balance between the interest of the 
patent holders and the interest of third parties—which is the basis of the European 
system—I am convinced we will have balanced and appropriate decisions.’” (quoting 
Benoît Battistelli, European Patent Office President)). 
2 See, e.g., Peter Leung, Will We See Globe-Trotting Patent Trolls Anytime Soon?, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. BLOG (June 20, 2013), http://www.managingip.com/Blog/
3221150/Will-we-see-globe-trotting-patent-trolls-any-time-soon.html (“In Europe, NPEs 
are still less active than in the US, perhaps due to key differences such as the 
unavailability of software and business method patents . . . .”).  In the U.S., software has 
been generally patentable since at least 1998. See State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Grp., 
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
In Europe, the situation is more complex.  Article 52 of the European Patent Convention 
expressly excludes from the scope of patentable subject matter “schemes, rules and 
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for 
computers.” Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European Patent Convention (EPC)].  However, as applied by 
the European Patent Office and U.K. courts, this provision only prohibits patenting 
software-based inventions that are “solely” computer algorithms and, thus, do not make a 
“technical” contribution to a non-excluded field. See Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., 
[2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, ¶ 40, [2007] 1 All E.R. 225 (A.C.) (Eng.) (holding that the 
relevant inquiry is whether the invention’s “contribution [is] solely of excluded matter” 
or, in other words, “whether the contribution is ‘technical’”); Case T0208/84, VICOM 
Systems Inc., 1987 O.J. E.P.O., ¶¶ 14–23.  This interpretation has proven to be so narrow 
that some commentators believe it has, for all intents and purposes, rendered Article 52 a 
dead letter. See Patrick E. King et al., The Confluence of European Activism and 
American Minimalism: “Patentable Subject Matter” after Bilski, 27 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 247, 255 (2011) (“Over the last twenty years, the EPO has 
effectively read the restriction against ‘programs for computers’ out of Article 52(2) in its 
struggle to find a test that affords the appropriate protection to inventions in the computer 
age.”). 
3 See, e.g., Mayergoyz, supra note 1, at 268–70 (“One . . . explanation for the lack of 
patent trolls in Europe relative to the United States is the European patent enforcement 
system as a whole; that is, complex and varying national laws may in themselves scare 
away the patent trolls.”).  In the U.S., a patent can be enforced nationwide in one district 
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cheaper cost of defense,4 smaller damages awards,5 differing 
cultures,6 and more frequent attorney’s fee awards.7 
                                                                                                             
court. See, e.g., Charlene Morrow & Sara Jenkins, Legal FAQ: Introduction to Patent 
Litigation, FENWICK & WEST LLP, http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/
Legal_FAQ_Patent_Litigation.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (“A patent infringement 
case can be filed in any district in the United States that has personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant . . . .”).  A patent can also be enforced for little or no up-front out-of-pocket 
expense due to the use of contingency fee representation. See generally David L. 
Schwartz, The Rise of Contingency Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. 
REV. 335 (2012).  Under the EPC—at least for the time being, see infra notes 9–10 
(describing proposals to create a Unified Patent Court)—patents are national rights that 
can only be enforced within the bounds of each member nation. See, e.g., TERENCE 
PRIME, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 176, 195 (2000).  As a result, 
widespread patent enforcement in Europe generally requires parallel litigation in multiple 
countries.  On a per capita basis, a patentee would have to sue in at least five European 
countries to match the jurisdictional reach of one patent suit in the U.S. See, e.g., 
Population (Total), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
(last visited July 17, 2013) (showing that the U.S. population is roughly 314 million, 
approximately equal to that of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. combined).  
In addition, most European nations, including the U.K., prohibit contingency fee 
litigation. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement 
Delay and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J. L. 
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 517, 518 (2003) (“In Europe, contingency fees typically are 
illegal or unenforceable . . . .”).  Accordingly, a patentee deciding whether to file suit 
must consider whether it can afford to pay hourly attorney’s fees up-front pending the 
outcome of the case and whether it can afford to lose those funds altogether should it lose 
the case. Cf. Virginia G. Maurer et al., Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and 
Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 307 (1999). 
4 See, e.g., Mayergoyz, supra note 1, at 260 (noting that U.S. patent trolls can “extract 
exorbitant licensing agreements” from their targets due to “two intertwined hurdles—the 
overwhelming cost of litigation and a high standard for proving patent invalidity,” both of 
which are less onerous in Europe).  Patent litigation is generally less expensive in Europe 
than it is in the U.S; the median cost of defending a U.S. patent case is about $2.5 
million. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 at I-155-56 (reporting median litigation costs of $2.5 million 
among survey respondents involved in mid-sized patent suits, i.e., those with between $1 
million and $25 million at stake).  In Europe, litigation costs about €100,000 to €400,000, 
or about $130,000 to $525,000, per party. Nicolas van Zeebroeck & Stuart Graham, 
Comparing Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look 5 n.4 (Sept. 8, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924124&download=
yes.  Potential infringers in Europe also have access to stronger, cheaper, and faster 
administrative alternatives to litigation. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, 
Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System: Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1002–1007 (2004); Mayergoyz, supra note 1, at 260–63. 
5 See, e.g., Fusco, supra note 1, at 120 (citing Thomas F. Cotter, Global Perspectives 
on Patent Law, (July 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“The most 
common explanations in the literature for the reduced presence of NPEs in Europe rely 
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Despite the common refrain, few scholars have studied patent 
troll litigation outside the U.S. and, as a result, little empirical 
evidence supports these frequent claims.  The lack of data on 
Europe’s experience with trolls is especially surprising today 
because those findings are now more relevant than ever in both the 
U.S. and Europe.  In the U.S., patent reform efforts targeting trolls 
are well underway.  Over roughly the last year, twelve separate 
bills have been introduced, many proposing the adoption (or 
expansion) of procedures long thought to be “troll-killers” in 
Europe.8 
                                                                                                             
on differences in the US and EU legal systems; in particular, they point to the availability 
of certain injunctions as well as the different level of damages awarded in patent cases.”).  
The median damages award in a U.S. patent case between 1995 and 2010 was about $5.1 
million, substantially higher than the average in Europe. See Chris Barry et al., 2011 
Patent Litigation Study, PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPER 9, http://www.pwc.com/en_US
/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2011-patent-litigation-study.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2014); Zeebroeck & Graham, supra note 4, at 5 n.5 (noting, for example, that the 
average patent infringement award in France was just over €21,000, roughly $28,000, in 
1998); see also THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 287 (2013) (“Among the broader structural features that keep 
damages judgments in check may be the absence of jury trials and limitations on 
discovery.”). 
6 See Fusco, supra note 1, at 125–26; Miquel Montañá, Obama on Patent Trolls: Will 
They Be Kept at Bay in Europe?, KLUWER PATENT BLOG (June 13, 2013), 
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2013/06/13/obama-on-patent-trolls-will-they-be-kept-at-
bay-in-europe (listing “a less litigious culture” as one reason for less patent troll activity 
in Europe). 
7 See, e.g., Morag Macdonald, Beware of the Troll, THE LAWYER (Sept. 26, 2005), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/beware-of-the-troll/116783.article (“Europe is less attractive 
to [patent trolls] for a number of reasons.  The main one of these is . . . . [i]n the US, if 
you lose a patent claim, you will only have to bear your own legal costs and not those of 
the winning party, as is the case to a greater extent in Europe.”).  Though expressly 
permitted by law, fee-shifting in U.S. patent cases is quite rare. See Colleen V. Chien, 
Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 323, 377 (2012) (reporting that between 
2005 and 2011, fees were awarded in just 56 of the approximately 3,000 total patent 
infringement suits).  By contrast, fee-shifting is routine in all types of cases across 
Europe. See id. at 368. 
8 See Posting of Matt Levy to the Patent Progress Blog, Patent Progress’s Guide to 
Patent Reform Legislation, http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/03/04/patent-progresss-
guide-to-patent-reform-legislation (Mar. 4, 2014) (listing, summarizing, and linking to 
the text of all 12 bills).  On December 5, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed 
the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013), sponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte, 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, by a vote of 325 to 91. See, e.g., id.  The 
Innovation Act proposes a number of reforms, including presumptive two-way fee-
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Europe similarly stands on the precipice of fundamental 
changes to its patent system.  In 2013, twenty-five EU member 
nations (including the U.K.) agreed to found a Unified Patent 
Court.9  If ultimately implemented, the court will allow some 
European patent owners—those who hold a “unitary patent”—to 
litigate continent-wide infringement allegations in a single court 
rather than seeking redress in each individual country, similar to 
the way in which U.S. patentees can pursue infringement claims in 
a single federal district court without filing suit in each state.10  
Many fear that this “federalization” of European patent 
enforcement will attract patent trolls to Europe.11 
                                                                                                             
shifting, a heightened pleading standard, patent ownership disclosure requirements, and 
codification of the customer suit exception. Id.  In addition, on June 4, 2013 the President 
released a set of executive orders and “legislative recommendations” expressing his 
support for many of the provisions included in pending patent reform bills, including 
more frequent attorneys fee awards. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-
white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
9 See Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/law-
practice/unitary/patent-court.html (last updated June 3, 2013).  The only E.U. members 
not to approve the court are Poland and Spain. See Unitary Patent Ratification Process, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprsop/patent/ratification/
index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2013). 
10 Creation of the Unified Patent Court will coincide with transition to a “unitary 
patent” giving protection across the continent. See Unitary Patent, EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/unitary-patent.html (last updated Jan. 
28, 2013) (noting that the unitary patent system, which has been provisionally approved 
by all E.U. members except Italy and Spain (and Croatia, which joined the EU after the 
agreement was signed), will go into effect on “1 January 2014 or the date of entry into 
force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, whichever is the later”).  Under the 
current regime, though a single application can be filed with the E.P.O., patents 
ultimately must issue from (and fees must be paid to) each individual nation state in 
which the patentee wishes to have protection. See, e.g., Samson Helfgott, PCT Filing and 
International Prosecution, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 8, http://www.aipla.org/
learningcenter/library/papers/bootcamps/07patentbootcamp/Documents/Helfgott-
paper.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (“[The E.P.O.] is a centralized search and 
examination organization operating on behalf of all of its member states . . . . [that] issues 
a grant of a European patent.  However, such grant does not give any rights.  Once 
granted it is then necessary for the applicant to decide into which of the member states he 
now wants his patent to be effective . . . . [and] provide the filing fees for entry into that 
country.”). 
11 See, e.g., EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT—HELP OR 
HINDRANCE?, 2010–12, H.C. 1799-I, at Ev w2 (arguing that the Unified Patent Court 
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Compared to the enormity of these proposed changes, relevant 
empirical evidence is in short supply.  Many important questions 
lack definitive answers.  Are trolls as rare in Europe as the 
conventional wisdom suggests?  If so, are they scarce due to the 
existence of procedural rules—such as fee-shifting provisions—
similar to those proposed in patent reform bills presently under 
consideration in the U.S.?  Or is the scarcity due to other reasons 
entirely—for instance, due to safeguards that a unified patent court 
might eliminate? 
In this Article, we take a first step toward answering these 
questions by reporting the findings of a study of patent litigation 
filed in the U.K.12 between 2000 and 2010 by patent holders that 
do not sell a product—commonly referred to as non-practicing 
entities (“NPEs”).13  We find that lawsuits involving NPEs are 
indeed rare in the U.K., but hardly non-existent.  Overall, NPEs 
account for eleven percent of patent suits litigated in the U.K. over 
the entire 2000-2010 period.14 
Taking a closer look at NPE litigation outcomes, we also make 
tentative assessments of common explanations for the lack of NPE 
                                                                                                             
“will favour non-practising entities (or patent trolls) to the detriment of UK 
manufacturing companies” (statement of James Hayles, President, IP Federation)), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/
1799/1799vw.pdf; Danny Hakim, Tech Giants Fear Spread of Patent Wars to Europe, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013, at B1 (reporting that a group of 14 American and European 
companies sent a letter to European officials expressing “fear that the new [Unified 
Patent Court] system could be vulnerable to what they call patent assertion entities, less 
politely known as patent trolls”); Alanna Byrne, EU to Adopt Unified Patent Court 
System, INSIDECOUNSEL (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/04/eu-to-
adopt-unified-patent-court-system (“[T]he unified patent court could bring more patent 
trolls out of the woodwork, since successful plaintiffs will be able to recover damages in 
nearly all EU countries.”). 
12 As we discuss below, the U.K. shares many things in common with the U.S. (both 
culturally and legally) and, thus, makes a good jurisdiction for comparative purposes. See 
infra note 96. 
13 The reason for not analyzing cases filed post-2010 is that complex patent cases can 
take several years to pass through the courts system, particularly if there are appeals.  For 
this reason, we only include cases filed up to 2010 in order to ensure as far as possible 
that we analyze cases that have reached an end point, either via settlement or via court 
ruling. 
14 We find an additional four cases filed by companies that, though they are not NPEs 
by our definition, purchased a large portfolio of patents for the purposes of monetization 
and, as a result, have been referred to as “patent trolls” by others. See infra Part II.A. 
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suits in Europe.  Notably, our findings cast doubt on the assertion 
that NPEs rarely sue in Europe because they are unable to obtain 
high-tech patents.  To the contrary, we find that NPEs litigating in 
the U.K. overwhelmingly—almost exclusively, in fact—assert 
high-tech patents, particularly those related to information and 
communications technology. 
Our findings tend to suggest, instead, that attorney’s fee awards 
are a key factor in the scarcity of NPE activities in Europe.  We 
find that U.K. NPEs, like their American counterparts, are 
extremely unsuccessful in their patent assertion efforts.  NPEs fail 
to prove infringement and have their patents invalidated— 
“revoked” in U.K. patent parlance—much more often than their 
product-producing counterparts.  Moreover, companies accused of 
infringement in the U.K. choose to litigate their cases to judgment, 
rather than settle, at relatively high rates.  As a result, we find that 
U.K. NPEs wind up paying large fee awards—generally in excess 
of £250,000—more often than they receive damages awards and 
settlement payments from the tech companies they sue.  In fact, 
our data suggests a pattern in which NPEs try their hand at 
litigation in the U.K., ultimately lose, pay a large fee award, and 
never attempt to litigate in the jurisdiction again. 
Though we caution against drawing broad conclusions from 
such a small number of cases, our findings tend to suggest that fee-
shifting deters NPEs from litigating in the U.K., and thus, fee-
shifting may successfully reduce the number of NPE suits in the 
U.S. as well.  Likewise, these findings may indicate that critics of 
the Unified Patent Court are—so long as the Unified Patent Court 
routinely awards attorney’s fees to winning litigants, which the 
current agreement states it will15—overestimating the court’s 
impact on NPE activity. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the 
methodology used in this study, Part II describes our findings with 
                                                                                                             
15 See Council Agreement on a Unified Patent Court No. 16351/12 of 20 June 2013, 
art. 69, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1, 18–19, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:175:0001:0040:EN:PDF (stating that “[r]easonable and 
proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a 
general rule, be borne by the unsuccessful party, unless equity requires otherwise, up to a 
ceiling set in accordance with the Rules of Procedure”). 
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respect to NPE litigation, and Part III explores what our findings 
suggest about conventional wisdom on trolling in Europe. 
I. STUDY DESIGN 
To study NPE litigation in the U.K., we set out to identify and 
gather key information with respect to all patent suits filed in 
England and Wales between 2000 and 2010 that were settled or 
litigated to a final adjudication.  In this Part, we explain how we 
constructed our database and what data we collected. 
A. Compiling a Database of Patent Suits 
The U.K. includes three independent judicial systems: England 
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.16  In England and 
Wales, patent suits can be brought in one of two courts—most 
often in the Patents Court division of the High Court (“PHC”) and, 
far less often, in the Patents County Court division of the Central 
London County Court (“PCC”).17  Cases from both courts can be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom (formerly the House of Lords).18  Patent suits 
may also be brought in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but the 
number actually filed in these jurisdictions is negligible and, thus, 
they do not play a role in our study. 
                                                                                                             
16 See, e.g., The Justice System and the Constitution, JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND AND 
WALES, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-in-detail/jud-acc-
ind/justice-sys-and-constitution (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (“The United Kingdom has 
three separate legal systems; one each for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.”). 
17 The PCC was created in 1990 to serve as an alternative venue to the PHC offering 
quicker and less expensive resolution of infringement claims—that is, what might be 
referred to in the U.S. as a patent “small claims” court. See H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS 
SERVICE, THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT GUIDE 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/patents-court/patents-court-guide.pdf (“[S]et 
up in 1990[,] . . . . [t]he PCC was intended to provide a less costly and less complex 
alternative to the High Court, Patents Court. The Patents Court is intended to deal with 
larger and more complex claims.”).  On October 1 2013, the PCC was renamed the 
Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court, but for the entirety of our study it was known 
as the PCC, and shall be referred to as such throughout this Article. 
18 Interim orders of the PCC cases are appealed to the PHC, but final orders are 
appealed to the Court of Appeals. See id. at 11. 
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To identify relevant patent cases filed in the PHC, we 
consulted the H.M. Courts and Tribunals Service’s Patents Court 
Diary.19  The Diary is a listing of all hearings scheduled before the 
PHC since December 1997 and, accordingly, contains at least one 
listing for all cases in which the defendant was served and 
responded.20  Claims that are filed, but settle before a defendant 
responds, are not made publicly available and, thus, are not 
included in our dataset.21  The diary entries provide basic 
information on the pertinent court cases, including the case 
number, the names of at least one claimant and at least one 
defendant, their legal representatives, the date of the scheduled 
hearing, and often whether the hearing was subsequently cancelled 
because the case was settled or stayed.22  Using this information, 
we searched detailed court records available via the British and 
Irish Legal Information Institute,23 Lexis,24 and Westlaw25 to 
record additional parties to the cases, the patents-in-suit, and case 
outcomes.26  Finally, to ensure that our database reflects only 
                                                                                                             
19 See Patent Courts Diary, H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/court-lists/list-patents-court-diary (last visited Mar. 4, 
2014). 
20 The Diary includes case management hearings, which the plaintiff must apply for 
within fourteen days of the defendant’s answer. See H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, 
CIV. P. R., PART 63.8, PRACTICE DIRECTION 5.3, available at http://www.justice.
gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part63/pd_part63#IDAPGAKC (“The claimant 
must apply for a case management conference within 14 days of the date when all 
defendants who intend to file and serve a defence have done so.”).  This means that cases 
are listed in the Court Diary regardless of whether a hearing eventually takes place; that 
is, if a case is settled or withdrawn before the first hearing, the case is still listed on the 
diary. 
21 There is no public data available on the number of cases dropped before an answer 
is filed.  Some cases heard at the Patents Court do not involve patents, but instead solely 
concern other IP rights such as design rights.  These cases were also excluded from our 
study. 
22 See supra note 19. 
23 BRITISH & IRISH LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.bailii.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
24 LEXISNEXIS UK, http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
25 WESTLAW UK, http://www.westlaw.co.uk (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
26 These sources did not provide any court records for a small number of cases that 
were listed in the diary, but which settled very quickly, often before even a preliminary 
court hearing.  For these cases we searched additional sources, such as media websites, 
blogs or the websites of parties’ legal representatives to gather as much information as 
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litigation involving issued patents, we excluded cases representing 
appeals from administrative decisions of the UK Intellectual 
Property Office (UK IPO).27 
PCC court records are not publicly available and, thus, are not 
included in our database.28  The best data we were able to obtain 
consisted of anonymized records for PCC cases adjudicated in 
2007 and 2008.29  These records suggest to us that less than ten 
percent of U.K. patent litigation takes place at the PCC30 and that 
NPEs virtually never file suit there.31 
                                                                                                             
possible.  In some instances, we were unable to obtain complete information; however, 
there is a core set of variables that we were able to obtain for all cases. 
27 These cases are the U.K. equivalent of appeals from the U.S. Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (formerly the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences). Compare 
Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 8 (U.K.) (establishing a patent applicant’s right to “refer” 
patentability decisions to the Comptroller General), and Patents Act, 1977, § 97 (stating 
that decisions of the Comptroller can be appealed to the PHC), with 28 U.S.C. § 1295 
(2012) (granting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)), and 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012) 
(establishing the PTAB). 
28 The PCC now publishes a case diary, but began doing so only in February 2011. See 
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (formerly Patents County Court) Diary, MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/court-lists/patents-county-
court-diary. 
29 This information was generously provided to us by the UK IPO, which previously 
received special permission to hand collect a small amount of data directly from the 
PCC’s archives provided it did not reveal the identity of the litigating parties. 
30 Based on our anonymized dataset of 2007-2008 PCC cases, we estimate that less 
than 10% of U.K. patent suits are filed in the PCC. Accord Zeebroeck & Graham, supra 
note 5, at 8 n.11 (noting that “the official Patent High Court diary . . . appeared to include 
over 90% of all [U.K. patent] cases decided in the period 2000–2009”). 
31 For one, cases brought in the PCC are limited in a number of respects for the express 
purpose of significantly reducing the cost of defense and the possible recovery—both of 
which patent trolls traditionally try to maximize. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2128 (2013) 
(dividing trolls into three primary groups: those that shoot for large damages awards, 
those that impose litigation costs to extract nuisance-value settlements, and those that 
aggregate large numbers of patents and rarely litigate).  For example, a patentee litigating 
at the PCC can recover no more than £500,000 in damages and £50,000 in legal costs, see 
THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT GUIDE, supra note 17, at 3, and generally will be limited to 
asserting no more than 3 claims, id. at 17.  Two of us previously estimated that, in 
practice, the amount at stake and fees incurred in PCC cases are typically far below these 
maximums. See Christian Helmers & Luke McDonagh, Patent Litigation in the UK, 10 
LAW SOC’Y ECON., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 13 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154939&download=yes (estimating 
that the average PCC case involves about £50,000 in damages and £10,000 in legal fees). 
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In all, we located 300 patent suits32 at the PHC over the eleven-
year period 2000-2010.33 
B. Patent-, Party-, and Suit-Specific Data 
For each suit, we gathered a variety of data relating to the 
outcome of the litigation and the patents and parties involved.34  
                                                                                                             
Second, we find that patents enforced at the PCC are relatively young and 
overwhelmingly cover simple mechanical inventions. Id.  They are not old high-tech 
patents, which tend to be trolls’ weapon of choice. See infra note 71 and accompanying 
text.  This uniformity may result from the fact that the PCC can transfer to the PHC cases 
that involve complex technology. THE PATENTS COUNTY COURT GUIDE, supra note 17, at 
18.  Finally, though we cannot identify the specific parties to these PCC cases, we can tell 
from court records that none of the patentees were individuals. See Helmers & 
McDonagh, supra (manuscript at 13–14).  Rather, they appear to be small companies that 
have been in business for a number of years in the metals/machinery industry. See id.  We 
are aware of just two counter examples.  One is an NPE case in our database that was 
filed in the PHC, but subsequently transferred to the PCC. See Envtl. Recycling Techs. 
Plc v Upcycle Holdings Ltd., [2012] EWHC 2097 (Pat) (Eng.) (transferring an NPE 
revocation suit originally filed in the PHC to the PCC because the patentee was relatively 
unsophisticated and unable to afford full-blown litigation expenses).  The other, which 
we discovered by searching media reports, is the only NPE suit we know of that was 
litigated exclusively in the PCC during the time period of our study. British Judge Rocks 
E-Data in Patent Suit, LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS (July 1, 2005), 
http://libn.com/2005/07/01/british-judge-rocks-edata-in-patent-suit (“Last month, E-Data, 
a ‘patent troll’ whose revenue hinges on pursuing infringement cases based on its 
intellectual property, lost a key case [in the PCC] . . . .”). 
32 For the purpose of clarity, where a number of separately filed cases involving the 
same parties were joined and heard together we considered these cases to be “one case.” 
The distribution of cases over the sample period is as follows: 2000: 19; 2001: 22: 2002: 
24; 2003: 28; 2004: 27; 2005: 28; 2006: 40; 2007: 31; 2008: 37; 2009: 21; 2010: 23. 
33 Two of us previously published a paper looking at this data for 2000-2008 in greater 
detail. Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 31.  By way of comparison, roughly ninety-
four times more patent suits were filed in the U.S. during the same period. LEX MACHINA, 
Districts, https://lexmachina.com/members/courts?filter=Patent (last visited July 19, 
2013) (showing that there were 28,180 total patent suits filed in the U.S. between 2000 
and 2010).  On a per capita basis, the ratio of U.S. to U.K. patent suits shrinks to 19:1. 
See Population (Total), supra note 3 (showing that the population of the U.K. is roughly 
1/5 of the U.S. population).  On a per patent basis, the ratio is even smaller, roughly 5:1. 
Compare U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2012, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2014) (showing that the U.S. issued 2,071,149 patents between 2000 and 
2010, including patents granted in 2000 and 2010), with Statistical Country Profiles: 
United Kingdom, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/
countries/gb.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (showing that the U.K. issued 106,969 
patents between 2000 and 2010). 
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First, for each patent-in-suit, we identified the patent’s priority 
date35 and technology classifications.36 
Next, for each suit, we identified all litigating parties and 
determined whether or not each patentee was an NPE.  In this 
study we define NPE as any patent-asserting37 entity that did not 
sell a product or (non-IP related) service at the time of its suit.38  
As a result, our database includes entities that fall outside the scope 
of other common designations like “patent assertion entity” 
(PAE)39 and excludes others that have been hit on occasion with 
                                                                                                             
34 In gathering this data we used a standardized case template created in collaboration 
with Ulrike Till. 
35 As in the U.S., the priority date for a patent in the U.K. is the filing date of the 
patent’s application or of the earliest relevant parent application to which it claims 
priority. Compare Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 63, Oct. 5, 1973, 
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).  Detailed information on the 
litigated patents was obtained from the European Patent Office’s (EPO) Espacenet and 
PATSTAT (version October 2011).  Since court records are not available for all cases 
and some court records do not identify the patent numbers, we have information on 
litigated patents for only 57% of court cases (171 cases) but 91% of all NPE cases (30 
cases). 
36 Specifically, we identified the patent’s International Patent Classification number. 
See International Patent Classification (IPC) Official Publication, WIPO, 
http://web2.wipo.int/ipcpub/#refresh=page (last visited July 19, 2013), as listed on 
PATSTAT. 
37 As discussed in greater detail below, we included both cases in which an NPE is 
suing a product-producing company for infringement and cases in which a product-
producing company is pre-emptively suing an NPE in hopes of invalidating one or more 
of its patents or showing that they are not infringed.  We excluded all other cases 
involving NPEs; for example, revocation actions filed by NPEs, disputes over patent 
ownership between NPEs and other parties, and disputes over the terms of already-
executed license agreements between NPEs and other parties.  Finally, we also excluded 
cases in which NPEs sued along with their product-producing exclusive licensees. 
38 Though we believe that this is the most common definition of the term, others have 
used alternative formulations.  RPX’s definition of NPE, for example, includes “non-
competing entities,” which are “practicing compan[ies] asserting patents that [they] do[] 
not [themselves] practice.” See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at A-6, A-6 n.2), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2146251 (describing the RPX 
database she and other scholars have used and explaining that she excluded NCEs from 
her analysis). 
39 Colleen Chien, who coined the term, defined PAEs as “entities . . . focused on the 
enforcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their patents.” 
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010).  The term 
“excludes universities, startups and others who seek to commercialize or transfer their 
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the “patent troll” moniker despite selling products at the time of 
suit.40 
Accordingly, we report statistics below for all NPEs, as well as 
the subset of NPEs that best fit the traditional definition of PAE.  
We also point out a set of suits brought by patentees that fall 
outside our definition of NPE and PAE but nonetheless share many 
characteristics in common with PAEs.  In this way, rather than 
providing our own definition of “patent troll,” we invite the reader 
to decide for him or herself where to draw the line. 
To classify among NPEs, we use a modified version of the 
NPE taxonomy developed by Lemley and Myhrvold.41  Our 
classifications are shown below in Table 1.  Class 1 includes 
companies in the business of enforcing patents acquired from 
others or salvaged from a failed product company or start-up.42  
Class 2 includes companies founded by an inventor for the purpose 
of holding and enforcing his or her own patents.  Class 3 includes 
universities and spin-offs formed to hold and enforce patents 
developed by university faculty.43  Class 4 includes start-up 
companies suing while their first product is still in development.  
Class 5 includes individual inventors suing in their own name.  
Class 6 includes companies formed to hold and enforce a patent 
pool created by a consortium of product-producing companies.  
And, finally, Class 7 includes companies formed to hold and 
                                                                                                             
technology.” Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 38, at 1 n.3.  Jeruss, Feldman, 
and Walker use a similar term, “patent monetization entity” (PME), which they define as 
“entities whose primary focus is deriving income from licensing and litigation, as 
opposed to making products.” Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 361 (2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  They exclude universities and individuals from the 
definition, but do include at least some IP-holding subsidiaries of product-producing 
companies. See id. at 369–70 (“[I]f a computer manufacturer were to spin part of its 
patent portfolio off into a separate entity . . . the spin-off should be classified as a patent 
monetization entity.”). 
40 See infra Part II.A. 
41 See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of 
the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
42 Our Class 1 is a combination of Lemley-Myhrvold Classes 1, 3, and 4. See id. 
43 Our Class 3 is a combination of Lemley-Myhrvold Classes 6 and 2. See id.  We find 
no examples of patents asserted by government entities or NGOs. 
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enforce patents covering technology developed by a product-
producing parent company. 
 





1 IP Licensing Company, Acquired Patents 
2 IP Licensing Company, Owned by 
Inventor 
3 University or Spin-off 
4 Start-up, Suing Pre-Product 
5 Individual 
6 Industry Consortium 
7 IP Subsidiary of a Product-Producing 
Company 
 
To classify the patentees in our database, we combined 
information obtained from court records, the patents-in-suit, the 
entities’ websites, and third-party databases like Compustat, 
Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and AMADEUS, and the ICC British 
Company Directory. 
Finally, we identified the type and outcome of each suit.  
English patent suits, like those filed in the U.S., can take one of 
several forms.  In addition to a typical infringement action—in 
which the patentee is the plaintiff and the defendant is the accused 
infringer—companies that fear future liability for patent 
infringement may themselves pre-emptively file suit against the 
patentee.44  In the U.K., these suits are known as “revocation” 
actions because they seek to invalidate, or “revoke,” the patent-in-
suit.45 We also observed a second form of declaratory judgment 
                                                                                                             
44 Patent litigation at the PHC is guided by the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). See 
generally H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, CIV. P. R., available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
45 See UNITED KINGDOM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, LITIGATION MANUAL, Ch. 
14 (March 2013 ed.), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/litigation-chapter14.pdf.  In 
conjunction with a revocation claim, or as an alternative to such a claim, a party can also 
seek a “declaration of non-infringement.”  The analogy between U.S. declaratory 
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action, one that seeks not to invalidate a patent but rather a 
declaration that it is not essential to an industry standard and, thus, 
not infringed by all products that comply with the standard. 
In addition to the type of claim underlying each suit, we 
identified the suit’s ultimate outcome.  We noted whether the suit 
settled or reached a final judgment and, if it was adjudicated, 
whether or not the patent-in-suit was found valid and infringed.46  
If the patent-in-suit was found valid and infringed, we recorded 
what remedies were awarded.47  If the patent was revoked or found 
not-infringed, we instead recorded whether the court awarded the 
accused infringer attorney’s fees and, if so, how much.48 
                                                                                                             
judgment actions and U.K. revocation actions is not a perfect one because the U.S. 
Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear pre-emptive actions like these. See 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–41 (1937) (interpreting art. 3, sec. 2 
of the U.S. Constitution, which limits juridical power to “cases” and “controversies,” as 
limiting federal courts’ jurisdiction to “definite and concrete,” as opposed to 
“hypothetical or abstract,” disputes).  As applied in the patent context, U.S. courts until 
recently would only exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which the 
plaintiff held “a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  Thus, in theory, revocation actions can be brought 
more freely in the U.K. than declaratory judgment actions in the U.S. See Mark D. Janis, 
Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. 
Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 109 (1997) (noting that the U.K. revocation system 
“employs a liberal standing requirement; no showing of interest is required”).  
Nonetheless, we find that most revocation/non-infringement actions filed against NPEs in 
the U.K. (14 of 19 total) were brought close in time to parallel actions filed in the U.S.—
i.e., when there did, in fact, appear to be a concrete dispute between the parties. Cf. 
Arkema, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 706 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding 
jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action brought against a patentee who had 
previously sued for infringement of foreign-counterpart patents in Germany and of other 
less-relevant patents in the U.S.); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 
F.3d 1330, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Related litigation involving the same technology 
and the same parties is relevant in determining whether a justiciable declaratory judgment 
controversy exists on other related patents.”). 
46 Our data on case outcomes includes the outcome of any appeals. 
47 As discussed below, no NPE suits were fully successful.  For a general discussion of 
remedies available in UK patent actions, see CHRISTINE GREENHALGH ET AL., STRATEGIC 
ADVISORY BD. FOR INTELL. PROP. POLICY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN 
SMALLER UK FIRMS: A REPORT FOR THE STRATEGY ADVISORY BOARD FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY POLICY 50–51 (2010), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-
ipenforcement-201010.pdf. 
48 H.M. CTS. & TRIBUNALS SERVICE, CIV. P. R., PART 44.3, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-44-general-rules-about-
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II. FINDINGS 
In this Part, we report our findings with respect to NPE 
litigation filed in the U.K.  We also compare these findings to 
corresponding data on U.K. patent litigation between product-
producing companies and to data on NPE litigation filed in the 
U.S. 
A. Overall Totals and Percentages 
Of the 300 total patent suits included in our database, we find 
that thirty-three, or eleven percent, involve NPEs.  A complete list 
of NPE suits is included at the end of this Article in Appendix A. 
Those thirty-three suits involve a total of twenty-eight unique 
NPEs.49  A histogram of NPEs arranged by classification is shown 
below in Figure 1. The figure shows that IP licensing entities—the 
group of NPEs generally viewed as most “trollish”—are the most 
common type of NPE in the U.K.50  Excluding suits filed by 
individuals, universities, and IP subsidiaries—i.e., all NPEs that 
are traditionally excluded from the definition of terms like PAE—
the percentage of “troll” litigation in the UK falls only slightly to 
eight percent. 
Overall, this is a modest amount of NPE litigation relative to 
the U.S., where studies have estimated that NPEs were responsible 
for roughly 25% of U.S. patent suits during the same timeframe.51  
                                                                                                             
costs#rule44.3= (stating that the “general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be 
ordered to pay the costs of the successful party” with the amount awarded reflecting “the 
conduct of all the parties; whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he 
has not been wholly successful; and any payment into court or admissible offer to 
settle”). 
49 Of the 28 total NPEs, three are individuals who sued along with their own IP 
licensing company, and two are individuals who sued along with a co-inventor.  Thus, 
though our list includes 8 total individuals, there were only three total suits involving just 
individual inventors suing in their own name(s). 
50 IP Licensing entities are also the most common type of NPE in the U.S. See Brian J. 
Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction 
Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1328 (2013). 
51 See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and 
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1604 n.168 
(2009) (finding, in a study of 2,300 high-tech patent suits filed between 2000 and 2008, 
that NPEs filed 10% of all suits initiated between 2000-2001, 16% between 2002-2003, 
16% between 2004-2005, and 20% between 2006-2008); Jeruss et al., The America 
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Moreover, we find no evidence that the rate of NPE litigation in 
the U.K. is on the rise.  To the contrary, NPE litigation has 
remained roughly stable in both absolute52 and relative53 terms.  
This finding contrasts sharply with experience in the U.S., where 
the rate of NPE litigation appears to have increased significantly 
during the same time period.54 
That said, our findings show that NPE litigation is hardly non-
existent in the U.K.  To the contrary, an 11% rate of NPE litigation 
roughly corresponds to the level of NPE activity present in the 
U.S. during 2000-2001,55 a time when U.S. lawyers and scholars 
were already highly critical of their litigation practices.56 
 
 
                                                                                                             
Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 357, 365, 377 (2012) (finding, in a study of 100 patent suits filed each year 
from 2007 to 2011, that the percentage attributable to NPEs was roughly 22% in 2007, 
27% in 2008, 33% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011); Robin Feldman et al., The 
AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., at 
*9, *55 (forthcoming 2014) (expanding their prior study to find that NPEs filed roughly 
59% of patent suits in 2012). 
52 The number of cases oscillates between three cases in 2000 and four in 2010. See 
infra App. A.  Though there is some variation among years, much of the variation results 
from parties filing multiple, near-simultaneous suits against one another.  For example, 
while there were seven cases filed in 2008, five of these seven were part of the same 
dispute between Nokia and IPCom. See id.  Thus, viewed in terms of “disputes” between 
parties, rather than individual cases, the rate of patent litigation has remained rather 
constant. 
53 The share of patent suits filed by NPEs was 16% of total cases in 2000 and 17% in 
2010. Compare id. with n.32 supra. 
54 See supra note 51. 
55 Chien, supra note 51, at 1604 (finding, in a study of 2,300 high-tech patent suits 
filed between 2000 and 2008, that NPEs filed 10% of all suits initiated between 2000-
2001). 
56 See Teresa Riordan, Trying to Cash in on Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at C2; 
Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE RECORDER (July 30, 2001), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005522332&slreturn=20131009163157 
(noting that, in 1999, patent claims against Intel totaled over $15 billion); Joff Wild, The 
Real Inventors of the Term “Patent Troll” Revealed, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. BLOG (Aug. 
22, 2008), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog (recounting how the term “patent troll” 
was coined at Intel in 1999 because, among other reasons, the company wanted to 
develop “a pithy term or phrase” that would help bring public attention to the problem of 
abusive patent litigation). 
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Figure 1: NPE Classification Histogram  
For the sake of completeness, we also note the presence in our 
database of three patentees that, though they operated a non-IP-
related business during the time of litigation, also filed a large 
number of suits asserting a portfolio of high-tech patents and, thus, 
have been labeled a “patent troll” by others in the past.  The first, 
Gemstar, just barely misses our definition of NPE because it still 
owned and operated TV Guide Magazine and the TV Guide 
Network when it filed suit against Virgin Media in 2008, alleging 
infringement of three patents covering various aspects of electronic 
program guides for TV set top boxes.57  Gemstar sold its TV Guide 
businesses just months later but pursued the case until 2011 when 
the Court of Appeal affirmed the PHC’s 2009 decision invalidating 
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all three asserted patents.58  Now known as Rovi Corp,59 Gemstar 
has aggressively asserted its patent portfolio and has been 
identified as an NPE or PAE by many commentators.60 
Another serial patent enforcer, Document Security Systems 
(DSS), also appears in our database, unsuccessfully defending a 
patent revocation action brought by the European Central Bank.61  
Though DSS maintains a customer base for its products and 
services, and thus is not an NPE or PAE by our definition, the 
company has been repeatedly hit with the “troll” label,62 
particularly after merging with NPE Lexington Technology Group 
and filing suit in the U.S. against the likes of Facebook, LinkedIn, 
Novell, and Salesforce.com.63 
A third patentee, Visto Corp, also warrants mentioning.  Our 
database includes two suits between Visto and smartphone maker 
                                                                                                             
58 See Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l Inc. v. Virgin Media Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 302, 
[43] (Eng.). 
59 See Company Overview of Rovi Guides, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 9, 
2013, 5:10 PM), http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?
privcapId=341789 (“The company was formerly known as Gemstar-TV Guide 
International, Inc. and changed the name to Rovi Guides, Inc. in May, 2008.  The 
company was founded in 1992 and is based in Santa Clara, California.  As of May 2, 
2008, Rovi Guides, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Rovi Corporation.”). 
60 See, e.g., Timo Fischer & Jaochim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for 
Technology: An Empirical Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions 29 (Apr. 28, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102. 
61 See European Cent. Bank v. Document Sec. Sys. Inc., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 600, 
[194] (Eng.); European Cent. Bank v. Document Sec. Sys. Inc., [2008] EWCA Civ 192, 
[52].  The ECB also filed claims to invalidate the patent in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, and Belgium, in an attempt to 
completely invalidate the patent in all nine jurisdictions. See Press Release, Document 
Security Systems, Inc., Document Security Systems to Move Forward with Infringement 
Suit vs. ECB (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Document
+Security+Systems+to+Move+Forward+with+Infringement+Suit+vs-a0172571704. 
62 See, e.g., Maxwell Fisher, Are Patent Litigations Skewing Earnings Reality?, 
MOTLEY FOOL BLOG NETWORK (Nov. 12, 2002), http://beta.fool.com, available at 
http://beta.fool.com/stockcroc1/2012/11/12/are-patent-litigations-skewing-earnings-
reality/16210. 
63 See Bascom Research, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-06293 (N.D. Cal); 
Bascom Research, LLC v. Linkedin Corporation, No. 3:12-cv-06294, 2013 WL 3355736 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2013); Bascom Research, LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-06295 
(N.D. Cal.); Bascom Research, LLC v. Salesforce.com, No. 3:13-cv-02891 (N.D. Cal.); 
Fisher, supra note 62. 
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RIM.64  Shortly before filing those suits, NTP—an NPE made 
famous for settling prior U.S. patent claims against RIM for $612 
million in 200665—acquired an equity stake in Visto and licensed 
the company many of its patents.66  Nonetheless, Visto continued 
to provide mobile email services during this time and, thus, was 
not an NPE by our strict definition.67 Other commentators have 
come to a contrary conclusion, however.68  In 2009, Visto acquired 
                                                                                                             
64 In 2008, Visto lost a suit against RIM when the PHC held that the patent-in-suit was 
invalid. See Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 335, [187]–
[188] (Eng.); Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 819, [1] 
(Eng.); Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 900, [29] (Eng.); 
Research in Motion UK Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 1921, [40] (Eng.).  RIM 
also counterclaimed for patent revocation. See Research in Motion UK Ltd v. Visto 
Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 3025, [2]–[3] (Eng.); Research in Motion UK Ltd v. Visto 
Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 3026, [12] (Eng.). 
65 See Press Release, Research in Motion Ltd., Research in Motion and NTP Sign 
Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation (Mar. 3, 2006), available at 
http://press.blackberry.com/press/2006/pressrelease-981.html. 
66 See Press Release, Visto Corp., Visto and NTP Sign Patent Licensing Agreement 
(Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/visto-and-ntp-
sign-patent-licensing-agreement-55539132.html; NTP Sticks It to RIM, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-12-14/ntp-
sticks-it-to-rim.  Visto also brought suit against RIM in the U.S. alleging infringement of 
four patents related to wireless data transmission. See Anne Broache, Visto Wins Patent 
Suit, Sues BlackBerry Maker, CNET NEWS (May 1, 2006), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1039_3-
6066898.html?part=rss&tag=6066898&subj=news.  That case followed earlier 
infringement suits against Microsoft, Good Technology, and others—suits that were 
financed by an investment of $35 million from patent litigation investment firm Altitude 
Capital Partners. See Joe Mullin, Visto v. Fixmo: Longtime Patent Litigant Kicks off 2012 
with a New Suit, PATENT EXAMINER (Jan. 11, 2012), http://patentexaminer.org/
2012/01/visto-longtime-patent-litigant-kicks-off-2012-with-a-new-patent-suit. 
67 Accord Victoria E. Luxardo, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate 
Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of 
“Fair Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 791, 805 (2006) (“NTP’s licensing 
scheme has in turn spawned new second-hand trolling, as exemplified by Visto’s suit 
against Microsoft in December 2005 and RIM in April 2006.  Though Visto does not fall 
under the definition of ‘patent troll’ because it does in fact practice the art, the chain 
reaction of litigation sparked by NTP is not optimal for efficient markets and judicial 
systems.”). 
68 See Mullin, supra note 66 (“Because it formed an alliance with patent-holding 
company NTP, Visto has been sometimes hit with the moniker ‘patent troll,’ even though 
its management has insisted it is a mobile e-mail company, where patent litigation is not 
the focus.”).  In a prior working paper, two of us included Visto’s suit within a broad 
category of “patent-assertion entity litigation.” Christian Helmers & Luke McDonagh, 
Trolls at the High Court? 10 LAW SOC’Y ECON., Legal Studies Working Paper No. 13 
(2012). 
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Good Technology (of which NTP also owned an equity stake) 
from Motorola in a deal that settled prior patent litigation between 
the companies and thereafter adopted the Good Technology 
name.69 
These companies epitomize the difficulties inherent in 
classifying patentees, as well as the lack of uniformity among 
commentators’ rubrics for doing so.  Were we to additionally 
include patent suits involving these companies, the share of PAE 
litigation would rise to 12.3%.  In the remainder of the paper, 
however, we use the strict definition of NPE introduced above that 
excludes Gemstar, DSS, and Visto. 
B. NPE Patents 
Comparing patents asserted in the U.K. by NPEs and product-
producing companies, we find that both sets of patents are roughly 
similar in age at the time of assertion, but that NPE-owned patents 
are far more likely to cover high-tech subject matter.  We also find 
that, prior to the time of suit, NPE-owned patents were unlikely to 
be identified as such in U.K. public records.  The latter two 
findings mirror similar results among NPEs litigating in the U.S. 
Figure 2 below compares the ages of patents asserted in the 
U.K. by NPEs and product companies.70  We find that both groups 
assert patents of a similar age, about eleven years post-filing on 
average.  U.S. NPEs assert patents on a comparable timeline, while 
U.S. product-producing companies generally file suit more 
quickly.71 
                                                                                                             
69 See Mullin, supra note 66. 
70 Here, by patent “age” we mean the number of years that passed since the patent’s 
priority date and the filing of the law suit in which it was asserted. 
71 See Love, supra note 50, at 1335 (finding that patents asserted by U.S. NPEs are, on 
average, asserted about 12 years post-filing, while U.S. product-producing companies 
assert patents are about 3 years younger on average).  The discrepancy between the ages 
of patents asserted by U.S. and U.K. product-producing companies is likely explained (at 
least in large part) by the fact that U.K. companies assert a much higher percentage of 
pharmaceutical patents, which tend to be litigated only when they are relatively old. See 
infra Figure 2 and Table 2; Love, supra note 50, at 1351 (noting that pharmaceutical 
patents are frequently litigated toward the end of the patent term against generic 
manufacturers seeking a head start in the production of low-cost alternatives to successful 
name brand drugs). 




Figure 2: Comparison of Litigated Patents by Age 
 Figures 3 and 4 compare the subject matter of patents asserted 
by NPEs and product companies, and Table 2 compares the 
industry designations of companies accused of infringing NPE- 
and product company-owned patents.72  NPE patents 
overwhelmingly cover high-tech inventions and are 
overwhelmingly asserted against high-tech companies, while 
product-company patents predominately relate to pharmaceuticals.  
About 70% of U.K. NPE patents were assigned a technology 
classification directly related to telecommunications or computing, 
and roughly 76% of companies accused of infringing an NPE 
patent operate in the high-tech, computer, and telecommunications 
                                                                                                             
72 Companies’ SIC codes were retrieved from various firm-level databases including 
Compustat, Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and AMADEUS, and the ICC British Company 
Directory.  We use the UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 
2003 published by the U.K. Office for National Statistics. See OFFICE FOR NATIONAL 
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industries.73  Further, we find that 76% of U.K. NPE patents are 
“software patents” as defined by Allison and Mann, and that 71% 
of U.K. NPE suits involve at least one software patent.74  These 
findings are consistent with existing studies of U.S. NPEs75 and 
tend to suggest that NPEs as a whole strongly favor aging high-
tech patents, even in jurisdictions where such patents are 












                                                                                                             
73 As used below in Table 2, “high-tech” is defined to include the manufacture of 
electrical and optical equipment (which contains manufacture of office machinery and 
computers; manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified; 
manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus; and 
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks). See id. at 
31–32.  The large share of companies sued by NPEs in “other services” is explained by 
cases HC06C03416 and HC07C03466 where an NPE Cranway Ltd. sued a number of 
companies in the electronic/video gambling and betting industry which is classified as 
“other recreational activities (SIC 9271).” 
74 As defined by Allison and Mann, “a software patent is one in which at least one 
claim element covers data processing—that is, the act of manipulating data—regardless 
of whether the code carrying out that data processing is on a magnetic storage medium or 
embedded in a chip.” John R. Allison & Ronald A. Mann, The Disputed Quality of 
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297, 309 (2007). 
75 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REG., Winter 
2011-2012, at 26, 29 (finding that 62% of patents litigated by NPEs between 1990 and 
2010 were “software patents” and 75% covered “computer and communications 
technology”); Love, supra note 50, at 1344 Figure 8 (finding that roughly 66% of NPE 
patent assertions were brought to enforce a software patent and 82% were brought to 
enforce a high-tech patent). 
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Figure 3: Tech. Class Comparison of Litigated Patents 
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Table 2: Industry Distributions 
Sector Prod. Co. Cases* NPE Cases‡ 
  # Firms % # Firms % 
Business Services 24 4.5% 1 2.0% 
Chemicals/Pharma. 197 37.2% 1 2.0% 
Computer Services 18 3.4% 3 6.1% 
Construction 4 0.8% 
Finance, Insurance, & Real 
Estate 4 0.8% 
Food 2 0.4% 
High-tech§ 82 15.5% 20 40.8% 
Metals & Machinery 66 12.5% 8 16.3% 
Other Manufacturing 28 5.3% 
R&D Services 12 2.3% 2 4.1% 
Textiles & Apparel 7 1.3% 
Trade 42 7.9% 
Transportation 8 1.5% 
Wood & Paper 6 1.1% 
Other Services¥ 4 0.8% 10 20.4% 
Telecommunications 16 3.0% 4 8.2% 
Petroleum & Refining 10 1.9% 
  530   49   
Notes: * Excludes NPE cases; ‡ Only companies sued by or suing NPEs; § 
High-tech: manufacture of electrical and optical equipment (which contains 
manufacture of office machinery and computers; manufacture of electrical 
machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified; manufacture of radio, 
television and communication equipment and apparatus; manufacture of 
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks); ¥ Other 
services: including gambling and betting activities as well as other unspecified 
service activities. 
 
 Finally, we also find that companies targeted by NPEs in the 
U.K. had little reason to suspect ex ante that the patents-in-suit 
were owned by NPEs.  For more than half of all NPE-asserted 
patents in our database, an entity other than the NPE involved in 
litigation was listed in the European Patent Office’s (EPO) 
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Espacenet online database as the patent’s legal owner.76  We 
cannot say from this data alone whether these NPEs were actively 
hiding their patent holdings.  However, this finding does match 
NPE behavior in the U.S.77 and, accordingly, tends to suggest that 
NPEs value concealing their activities both in the U.S. and 
abroad.78 
C. NPE Litigation 
Next, taking a closer look at individual cases, we find that U.K. 
NPE suits are predominantly revocation actions and rarely end in 
success for NPEs.  As shown below in Table 3, the majority of 
U.K. NPE cases (61%) were initiated by the accused infringer, 
rather than the patentee.  This rate of revocation/non-infringement 
claims is high compared to both U.K. product-producing 
companies and U.S. NPEs.  In the U.S., just 14-15% of patent suits 
are filed by possible infringers, and even that number is inflated by 
the fact that many are filed after an infringement action for the 
purposes of forum shopping.79 
                                                                                                             
76 Espacenet Patent Search, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://worldwide.
espacenet.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).  A list of these patents is included in 
Appendix B. 
77 See, e.g., Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Assoc., to the 
FTC (Apr. 5, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/pae/pae-0042.pdf 
(“Under the present [U.S. patent] system it is too easy for PAE’s to hide behind legal 
fictions . . . . [T]his secrecy makes it very difficult to determine what patents a PAE 
owns, . . . . allow[ing] a PAE to increase its market power by acquiring a portfolio 
containing substitute patents . . . [and] creat[ing] an environment that is ripe for abuse and 
gamesmanship.”).  One large U.S.-based NPE, Intellectual Ventures, reportedly holds and 
enforces its patent portfolio via a network of roughly 2,000 shell companies. See Method 
and System for Exposing Multi-Billion Dollar Racketeering Scheme, PLAINSITE (Dec. 17, 
2012), http://www.plainsite.org/articles/article.html?id=2.  Legislation presently pending 
in the U.S. would pressure patentees to disclose patent transfers by limiting patentees’ 
ability to recover damages for infringement that occurred during periods when ownership 
records were out of date. End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (May 16, 
2013). 
78 See Markus Reitzig et al., Collateral Damage for R&D Manufacturers: How Patent 
Sharks Operate in Markets for Technology, 19 INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 947, 947 
(2010) (noting that patent trolls “exploit information asymmetries in markets for 
technology”). 
79 See Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment 
to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1081, 1082 Table 2 
(2012) (finding that 13.9% of patent suits filed in 2008 were declaratory judgment actions 
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Table 3: Comparison of Claim Types 
Prod. Co. NPE 
  # Cases % # Cases % 
Infringement 116 43.4% 13 39.4% 
Revocationˣ 85 31.8% 17 51.5% 
Other** 30 11.2% 3 9.1% 
n.a.‡ 36 13.5% 0 0.0% 
          
Total 267 100.0% 33 100.0% 
ˣ Includes partial revocation; ** Includes declaration of 
non-infringement; ‡ Claim unknown. 
 
Moving to case outcomes, shown below in Table 4, we find an 
unexpectedly large number of invalidity and non-infringement 
rulings.  While 75% or more of U.S. patent suits settle,80 just 51% 
(17 out of 33) U.K. NPE cases ended in settlement, and even this 
number is arguably inflated.  Six suits that settled were part of two 
larger disputes—four were effectively part of the same long-
                                                                                                             
(335 of 2412) and that 13.4% of declaratory judgment actions were brought by an 
accused infringer who filed suit after the patentee and moved to transfer venue of the 
dispute to the court hearing the declaratory judgment action (45 of 335)); see also Jeanne 
C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1464 (2010) (finding that 15.5% of 
utility patent suits filed in 2005, except those filed in the “notoriously patentee-friendly 
Eastern District of Texas,” were declaratory judgment actions); Kimberly A. Moore, 
Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (finding that 14% of patent suits that terminated between 1983 
and 1999 were declaratory judgment actions). 
80 See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 687–689, (2011) (finding that between 2000 and 2010, 
patentees that asserted the same patent in eight or more cases settled about 89% of the 
time, or 1,004/1,134 of all cases in the dataset that were not still pending); Sara Jeruss et 
al., The AIA 500 Expanded, supra note 51 (manuscript at 79 Table) (finding that patent 
suits filed by NPEs in 2007-2008 and 2011-12 settled or ended with a consent judgment 
about 75% of the time, and only reached a judgment on the merits about 3% of the time); 
Love, supra note 71 at 1346 Table 9 (finding that of litigated U.S. patents issued between 
May 1993 and May 1994, roughly 80% were never adjudicated on the merits). 
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running dispute between Nokia and IPCom and two were part of 
the same dispute between Nokia and Interdigital.81 
Further, in those cases that proceeded to judgment, U.K. NPEs 
were surprisingly unsuccessful.  Of the twelve NPE cases that 
ended with a full judgment, infringement was found in just one 
case, and even that was a partial victory— only one of the four 
patents asserted in the case was found to be essential to, and thus 
infringed by, the technological standard at issue.82  In all other 
adjudicated NPE suits, the asserted patents were held to be either 
not-infringed or invalid,83 giving U.K. NPEs an abysmal eight 
percent success rate, well below that for U.K. product-producing 
patentees.84  That said, these findings are roughly consistent with 
the performance of U.S. NPEs, which also fail to prove validity 
and infringement at extremely high rates, both in absolute terms 
and relative to their product-producing counterparts.85 
 
 
                                                                                                             
81 See infra app. A. 
82 See Nokia v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., [2007] EWHC (Pat) 3077, [134] (Eng.). 
83 The patent-in-suit in Rambus’s suits against Micron and Hynix/Hyundai was first 
revoked by the EPO, not the PHC. See Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor UK Ltd, 
[2004] EWHC (Pat) 2313, [4] (Eng.) (“There were challenges to the patent in the 
European Patent Office and . . . . [t]he result of that challenge is that the patents were 
revoked and it is for that reason that Hynix and Micron now seek to have these 
proceedings dismissed.”). 
84 We also find that NPEs are extremely unsuccessful on appeal.  In suits between 
product-producing companies between 2000-2010, judgments were appealed about 45% 
of the time to the Court of Appeal, and those appeals affirmed the PHC three quarters of 
the time.  NPE suits, by contrast, were appealed just 4 of 12 times, and the PHC decision 
was affirmed every time in those appeals. 
85 See Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 
supra note 80, at 693 Table 8 (finding that between 2000 and 2010, NPEs that asserted 
the same patent in eight or more cases lost more than 92% of the time when they litigated 
to a judgment, while equally-litigious product-producing companies won 40% of time); 
Love, supra note 50, at 1346 Table 9 (finding that, of litigated U.S. patents issued 
between May 1993 and May 1994, more than 83% owned by NPEs were found not-
infringed or invalid, while almost 48% of those owned by product-producing companies 
were found valid and infringed); Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded, supra 
note 51 (manuscript at 87) (finding that, in U.S. patent cases filed in 2007-2008 and 
2011-12, product-producing companies won about 44% of the time their patents were 
adjudicated on the merits, while PMEs and individuals won just 17% and 23% of the 
time, respectively). 
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Finally, we report information on fee-shifting awards in U.K. 
NPE suits.  Unfortunately, due to the widespread practice of parties 
settling fee amounts outside of court,86 we find publicly available 
information for just two NPE disputes—and even that information 
is incomplete.  After losing its consolidated suits against Micron 
and Hyundai, Rambus was ordered to pay its adversaries’ fees in 
2004.87  Micron estimated its costs at £698,000 ($1,151,000), and 
Hyundai estimated its costs at £233,000 ($384,000);88 however, the 
parties subsequently settled the issue before the court could make a 
final ruling on the fee award.  Similarly, in January 2010, the PHC 
ruled in an on-going case between IPCom and Nokia that Nokia 
had prevailed on enough issues to qualify for a future fee award in 
the case.89  At the time, Nokia estimated that its fees in the case 
were £1.3 million ($2.1 million).90  In a subsequent hearing, the 
court estimated Nokia’s fees for all cases between the two parties 
at “close to £3 million” ($4.9 million) and ordered IPCom to pay a 
two-thirds share.91  
Overall, the outcome between Nokia and IPCom is a very 
common one.  Across all patent litigation, the “winning” party 
recovers on average about two-thirds of its requested legal fees, 
                                                                                                             
86 See Chris Forsyth & Justin Watts, A Guide to Patent Litigation in England and 
Wales, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP 8 (Sept. 2011), http://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=6bd0f5bc-df2c-4578-8102-02c6d3c9946f (noting that courts 
may assess fee awards if “the parties are unable to agree the costs to be paid by the losing 
party” and that the “assessment procedure may take several months and involves a ‘mini-
trial’” for which the losing party may also pay). 
87 See Rambus, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor UK Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Pat) 2313, [47] 
(Eng.) (ordering “that the claimant shall pay the costs of these actions to the defendants to 
be assessed, if not agreed”). 
88 Id. at [6]. 
89 Nokia GMBH v. IPCom GMBH, [2010] EWHC (Pat) 790, [12] (Eng.). 
90 Id. at [3].  At the same hearing, IPCom’s costs were estimated to be £300,000. Id. 
91 Nokia GMBH v. IPCom GMBH, [2010] EWHC (Pat) 791, [1] (Eng.).  We also 
observed two fee awards in cases involving companies that almost meet our NPE/PAE 
criteria.  In Gemstar v. Virgin Media, Virgin Media won a fee award of 86.5% of the £2.4 
million it estimated it has spent on the case (that is, roughly £2 million ($3.3 million)). 
Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l v. Virgin Media Ltd., [2009] EWHC (Pat) 3552, [4], [35] (Eng.).  
In RIM v. Visto, due to the fact that various issues in the case went both ways, Visto was 
ordered to 66% of RIM’s estimated £6 million ($9.9 million) of costs and RIM was 
ordered to pay 51% of Visto’s estimated £1.6 million ($2.6 million) of costs. Research in 
Motion U.K. Ltd. v. Visto Corp., [2008] EWHC (Pat) 819, [15], [50] (Eng.).  The net 
result was a fee award in RIM’s favor of over £3.1 million ($5.1 million). 
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depending on how various aspects of the case were won or lost.92  
Further, our prior research suggests that the cost of defending a 
case to judgment at the PHC runs between £500,000 ($825,000) 
and £3 million ($4.9 million).93  Thus, though we lack the data to 
say so with much additional certainty, we think it is fair to estimate 
that in the remaining NPE cases that reached judgment, the parties 
reached a settlement in which the losing patentee agreed to pay the 
winning accused infringer no less than about £250,000 ($410,000).  
By contrast, in the U.S., where courts award attorney’s fees only in 
“exceptional” cases,94 patentees who fail to prove their claims only 
                                                                                                             
92 See Richard Willoughby, United Kingdom, in GLOBAL PATENT LITIGATION: 
STRATEGY AND PRACTICE 32 (Willem A. Hoyng & Frank W.E. Eijsvogels eds., 2008) 
(“[I]t is usual for the winning party to recover from the loser approximately 60% or 65% 
of the actual costs incurred by the winning party.”); see also FORSYTH & WATTS, supra 
note 86, at 8 (“A successful party will recover a proportion of its legal costs from the 
losing party.  This usually works out at about half to two-thirds of its total legal costs.”). 
93 See Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 31 (manuscript at 22); see also FORSYTH & 
WATTS, supra note 86, at 8 (“When cases go to trial in the English system, each side will 
usually incur total costs in the region of €1.5m.  Costs in small cases can be much lower.  
Costs under €0.75m are low and costs will go over €3m only in very large and complex 
cases.”); Michael Burdon, The UK: Can a High-Cost Country Change Its Way?, WIPO 
MAG. (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01
/article_0003.html (“[T]he cost of legal representation and experts in most patent disputes 
conducted in the U.K. is unlikely to be estimated at less than £350,000.”); Garreth 
Duncan, Challenging Competitors’ Patents in the UK—Patent Revocation, D YOUNG & 
CO (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.dyoung.com/article-patentrevocation (“Typically, 
infringement/revocation actions in the Patents Court . . . cost in the region of £200,000 to 
£500,000 for straight-forward cases but can cost up to and more than £1,000,000 for 
complex cases.”). 
94 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).  This term the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted cert in a pair of cases that challenge the current standard for determining whether 
a patent case is “exceptional.” See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 
496 F. App'x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) 
(No. 12-1184); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163).  As of 
this Article’s publication, the Court had not released an opinion in either case.  Fees are, 
on occasion, also awarded in patent suits under other statutes and rules. See, e.g., Ajeet 
Pai, Attorneys’ Fee Awards in Patent Litigation, VINSON & ELKINS, LLP (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/AjeetPaiAttorneysFee 
AwardsPatentLitigationCLE_Aug2010.pdf (listing as additional bases for recovering 
attorney fees F.R.C.P. Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, F.R.A.P. 38, and courts’ inherent 
powers). 
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wind up paying their opponents’ attorney’s fees about two percent 
of the time.95 
III. ANALYSIS 
Finally, we make a few broad observations in light of the data 
reported above.  Though we caution against drawing strong 
inferences from such a small number of cases, we believe our 
findings suggest that routinely awarding attorney’s fees in patent 
suits will reduce the number of NPE suits filed in the U.S. and that 
the Unified Patent Court should, like most of its member states, 
incorporate a generally-applicable fee-shifting mechanism to deter 
NPE litigation. 
Our conclusion is based on several similarities between patent 
litigation in the U.S. and the U.K. as well as several of our 
findings.  First, many alternative explanations for the relative 
paucity of NPE litigation in Europe seem especially weak when 
applied to the U.K.  Among European nations, the U.K. is almost 
certainly the most similar to the U.S.  Culturally, the U.K. and U.S. 
share a common language, a common history, and as a result a 
traditional (and unique among European nations) body of common 
law.96  More specifically, in the realm of patent litigation, the U.K. 
                                                                                                             
95 See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 323, 377 
(2012) (reporting that between 2005 and 2011, fees were awarded in just 56 of the 
approximately 3,000 total patent suits in which there was a ruling on the merits).  Though 
similar data has not been collected for U.S. patent cases, in U.S. copyright suits in which 
attorney’s fees were awarded, prevailing copyright holders have received 89% of their 
fee award requests, and prevailing defendants 61%. Id. at 374–75; see also Saurabh 
Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 
(forthcoming 2014) (collecting data on attorneys fee award orders issued  in patent cases 
between 2003 and 2013). 
96 See, e.g., Vipin Gupta et al., Cultural Clusters: Methodology and Findings, 37 J. 
WORLD BUS. 11, 13 (2002), available at http://wase.urz.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/
Journal%20Library/International%20Management%20Models/Cultural%20Clusters.pdf 
(discussing broad cultural similarity between the U.S. and U.K and finding in a survey of 
people from 61 nations that there are 10 “cultural clusters” in the world and that the U.K. 
shares more in common with the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand than it does 
with other European nations); FORSYTH & WATTS, supra note 86, at 1 (discussing 
similarities in legal and business culture that make comparisons between the countries 
particularly apt) (“The English legal system is . . . a common law system and the 
procedures and practices of English courts differ significantly from those of courts in 
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has among the largest damages awards,97 highest costs of 
defense,98 and the most onerous discovery requirements in 
Europe.99  The U.K. and U.S. also share a great deal in common 
with respect to substantive Patent law.100  Accordingly, possible 
                                                                                                             
other European jurisdiction.”); see also Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in 
the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 581 (2010) (“In their 
corporate governance systems, financial structures, and business cultures more generally, 
the United States and the United Kingdom arguably have more in common than any other 
pair of developed economies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James E. Gregory & 
Jennifer Wheater, US/UK Tax Issues for Internationally Mobile Executives, 13 BUS. L. 
INT’L 279, 279 (2012) (“Because of their common language, culture and financial 
prominence, the links between the United States and the United Kingdom are especially 
well-developed and, as a result, there is a constant flow of high-level managerial and 
executive talent between these two countries.”); Lisa Vanhala, Legal Opportunity 
Structures and the Paradox of Legal Mobilization by the Environmental Movement in the 
UK, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 523, 547 (2012) (“As the only country with a common law 
legal system in the European environment, the UK can serve as the closest comparator 
for developments in the U.S.”). 
97 See Zeebroeck & Graham, supra note 4, at 24; cf. COTTER, supra note 5, at 226 
(“[T]he amount of damages awarded [by U.K. courts in patent cases] appears . . . to be 
relatively modest compared to U.S. standards . . . . Nevertheless, the rules [U.K.] courts 
apply in calculating monetary awards are hardly stacked against patent owners . . . . [and] 
tend to favor patent owners to a greater degree than economic reasoning would suggest 
desirable.”). 
98 See COTTER, supra note 5, at 173 (“The cost of proceeding to trial [in the U.K.] 
remains high by European . . . standards . . . .”); RUPERT JACKSON, L.J., REVIEW OF CIVIL 
LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 250 (2009), available at http://www.ciarb.org
/information-and-resources/2010/01/22/Review%20of%20Civil%20Litigation%20Costs
%20Final%20Report.pdf (“[R]eviewing costs across different EU states . . . ‘[t]he UK 
system is the most costly one . . . .’” (quoting Dietmar Harhoff)); Kimberlee Weatherall, 
et al., IP Enforcement in the UK and Beyond: A Literature Review, STRATEGIC ADVISORY 
BD. FOR INTELL. PROP. POL’Y 43–44 (May 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-ipenforcement-200905.pdf (comparing UK patent 
litigation costs to those in France, Germany, and the Netherlands). 
99 See David Perkins & Garry Mills, Patent Infringement and Forum Shopping in the 
European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 564 (1996) (“The English system, unlike 
those of its continental European counterparts, involves documentary discovery . . . .”); 
Karin Retzer & Sherman Kahn, Balancing Discovery with EU Data Protection in 
International Arbitration Proceedings, 3 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. L. 47 (2010) (“[C]ivil law 
jurisdictions (such as those in continental Europe) generally limit disclosure of evidence 
to what is proffered by each party as evidence in support of the party’s case. In contrast, 
pre-trial discovery obligations in common law countries, particularly in the United States, 
but also in the UK, are much broader.”). 
100 See COTTER, supra note 5, at 165 (noting “affinities among the U.K., Canadian, and 
Australian [patent] regimes . . . , as well as with the U.S. [patent] system”); Donna M. 
Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial Judges? An Empirical 
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explanations for Europe’s ability to repel trolls that center on broad 
differences in culture, law, and litigation practice appear to apply 
with less force in the U.K.101 
Further, we find in our data that, despite more restrictions on 
the patentability of software,102 U.K. NPEs overwhelmingly assert 
software patents covering telecommunications and computer 
technology.103  In short, it does not appear that the U.K. has a 
shortage of high-tech patents available for NPEs—as some have 
postulated104—but rather a shortage of companies willing to assert 
patents, period, regardless of the type of invention they cover.  We 
also find that U.K. NPEs can and do obscure patent ownership 
before filing suit,105 and thus have at least one more tactical 
advantage (in addition to high costs and large damages awards) in 
common with their U.S. counterparts.106  Combining these facts 
                                                                                                             
Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of Professor 
Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 183–85 (2009) (noting a similar origin for 
U.S. and U.K. patent law, as well as similarities in “the basic requirements of 
patentability—novelty, utility, and nonobviousness” and claim construction doctrines and 
procedure). 
101 To be clear, there are other specific differences between the litigation and patent 
systems in effect in both countries—for example, the widespread use of juries in the U.S. 
to determine infringement and damages, see Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in 
Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 794 (2001) (“The 
U.S. may be the only country in the world that uses juries to decide patent disputes . . . . 
English juries are not available in patent cases, or in most other civil cases.”), and a 
higher standard for invalidating U.S. patents, see Patent Law and Regulation, 
LEXISNEXIS (UK), http://lexisweb.co.uk/sub-topics/patent-law-and-regulation (last visited 
Nov 10, 2013) (“There is no presumption of validity for UK patents once they are 
granted.”).  However, as discussed below, these differences are arguably irrelevant given 
NPEs’ similar rate of success in both countries. See supra note 85 and accompanying text 
(discussing NPEs’ win rate in patent suits filed in the U.S. and in patent suits filed in the 
U.K.). 
102 See supra note 2. 
103 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra note 2. 
105 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
106 Another arguable advantage they share is access to specialized patent courts. See 
Timothy B. Lee, Specialist Patent Courts Are Part of the Problem, FORBES TECH BLOG 
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2011/08/19/specialist-patent-
courts-are-part-of-the-problem (arguing that specialized patent courts—including the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as well as de facto specialized trial courts 
like the Eastern District of Texas that see a large number of patent suits—tend to skew in 
favor of stronger patent rights because they become captured by the patent attorney bar). 
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and findings, it would appear that U.K. and U.S. NPEs operate in a 
roughly similar cultural and legal environment and share many of 
the same tactical advantages in litigation. 
So what, then, accounts for the marked difference in NPE 
activity between the U.K. and U.S.?  At first blush, the low rate of 
success for U.K. NPE suits may seem like a plausible explanation.  
However, U.S. NPEs as a whole are not much more successful 
than those in the U.K.107  In fact, sophisticated NPEs actually lose 
slightly more often in the U.S.108  A review of U.S. NPE suits 
related to those in our U.K. database, included below in Appendix 
C, provides further confirmation.109  Fourteen U.K. NPE suits in 
our database proceeded in parallel to a U.S. action between the 
same two parties.110  In all four parallel U.S. actions that have been 
adjudicated to date, the NPE lost on summary judgment.111  In fact, 
among all 138 suits that NPEs in our database filed in the U.S. 
during the same timeframe, not a single case has been resolved on 
the merits in an NPE’s favor.112 
In our view, the most likely explanation for differing rates of 
NPE litigation is not the low rate of success we observe, but rather 
that lack of success in a system that routinely awards fees to the 
winning party.  Unlike those litigating in the U.S., NPEs deciding 
whether to file suit in the U.K. must consider the very real 
possibility that they will not only fail to win damages and recoup 
their own legal fees, but also that they will have to pay the accused 
infringer an amount approximating two-thirds of the cost of 
defense.  As discussed above, it is unlikely that an unsuccessful 
NPE could walk away from a case paying less than about 
£250,000, the equivalent of about $375,000. 
Two other observations in our data also tend to support this 
conclusion.  First, we find very few repeat litigants among U.K. 
NPEs.  Virtually every NPE case in our database ended in defeat 
for the NPE, followed by a hefty payout of fees, and no further 
                                                                                                             
107 See supra notes 84–85. 
108 Id. 
109 Infra app. C. 
110 Infra app. C. 
111 Infra app. C. 
112 Infra app. C. 
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attempts at litigation.  By contrast, many of these NPEs filed a 
large number of suits in the U.S. over a long period of time, despite 
a similarly abysmal record of success.113  One explanation for this 
pattern is that a series of NPEs tested the waters in the U.K., found 
the experience too expensive, and thereafter chose to direct their 
resources elsewhere. 
Second, as discussed above, we find a surprisingly low rate of 
settlement in U.K. NPE cases and a surprisingly high percentage of 
revocation and non-infringement claims.  In short, despite an 
average cost of defense that rivals those in the U.S., tech 
companies accused of infringement in the U.K. are 
disproportionately willing to fight to a judgment and, moreover, to 
initiate litigation and force the patentee’s hand.  Again, a 
comparison to related U.S. litigation bears this out—of the 138 
patent suits filed in the U.S. by NPEs in our database, 125 (or 
roughly 90%) settled.114  One explanation for this phenomenon is 
that accused infringers are more willing to fight, and less willing to 
settle, because they stand to recoup a large portion of their costs if 
they win.115  Taken together, these two observations suggest that 
fee-shifting acts to deter patent monetization by changing the 
behavior of both plaintiffs and defendants—accused infringers 
become more likely to fight (and thereby to deny patentees a quick, 
positive settlement and to impose a large, negative penalty); and, 
                                                                                                             
113 Infra app. C. (showing that 14 of the 28 NPEs that litigated in the U.K. also filed 
suit in the U.S. and that, in the U.S., they brought a total of 138 suits against a total of 
293 accused infringers). 
114 Infra app. C. 
115 Economic theory suggests that fee-shifting tends to reduce the number of low-
probability-of-success suits that are filed, but also to increase the likelihood that suits 
which are filed will proceed to trial rather than settle. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing 
Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 141, 143 (1998) (“[T]he English rule of fee allocation 
(in which the loser pays the winner’s litigation costs) is better at discouraging suits by 
low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs than the American rule” but “the English rule 
causes a greater number of cases to go to trial.”).  For empirical evidence of these effects, 
see Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the 
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 475 (2004) (noting that Florida’s 
experience with fee-shifting in medical malpractice cases brought in the early 1980s was 
that “the threat of additional legal fees did somewhat reduce the number of malpractice 
cases filed, [but] also increased the number that went to trial”). 
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as a result, patentees become less likely to file suit in the first 
place. 
CONCLUSION 
Comparisons of the European and American experiences with 
NPEs have so far been long on anecdote and short on data.  
However, with the U.S. presently searching for mechanisms to 
curb NPE patent enforcement and the E.U. presently considering 
adopting measures that many expect to do the opposite, hard data 
is needed now more than ever.  With this Article, we take a first 
step in building an empirical foundation upon which to study 
patent troll activities on both sides of the Atlantic, and we hope 
that other scholars will follow suit. 
Though patent trolls are indeed rare in the U.K. when 
compared to the U.S., we find that they nonetheless account for a 
substantial and consistent share of U.K. litigation between 2000 
and 2010.  They are, in short, hardly a uniquely American 
phenomenon, as some policymakers have suggested.  Moreover, 
we find evidence that fee-shifting, more so than other possible 
explanations, is responsible for the relatively low rate of NPE 
litigation in the U.K. compared to the U.S.116  Though we caution 
against basing international patent policy on the experience of any 
one country, our results lend support to patent reform measures 
currently pending in the U.S. that would increase the frequency 
with which fees are shifted in patent suits.  Our findings also 
suggest that Europe’s new Unified Patent Court may not have as 
much of an impact on NPE litigation in Europe as some contend, 
so long as it too routinely awards fees to the winning party.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
116 This finding was discussed during a recent question and answer session in the UK 
House of Commons concerning the impact of ‘patent trolls’ on the UK economy.  
Reference was made in this debate to Helmers & McDonagh, supra note 65.  This 
discussion was reported in the UK Parliamentary record (Hansard) on March 20, 2014, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140320/text/140320w
0002.htm#14032098000031. 
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Appendix A 
U.K. NPE Cases (2000-2010) 
 
Yearʶ Case No. NPE Class. Claimant(s) Defendant(s) Claim Outcome 
2000 HC00C4176 & 
HC00C4177 






    















Infringement Valid, Not 
infringed 









 HC01CO4779 2 Frontline Tech. 
Ltd. 
Tasc Computers Infringement Settled 
























 HC03C02951 & 
HC03C02952 
3 Affymetrix UK  
Ltd 
Affymetrix Inc 
Multilyte Ltd Revocation Settled 
      
2004 HC04C01952 2 Nokia Corp. Interdigital Tech
Corp. 
Revocation Settled 
2005 HC05C00661 5 Jerome Canady Olympus Corp.
Keymed Ltd. 






 HC05C01175 1 T-Mobile U.K. Ltd.
Research in  
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3 out of 
 4 patents  
Not Infringed





























    










       
2007 HC07C03177 7 Assa Abloy AB 
Aontec Teoranta 
Smartrac IP BV Revocation Settled 














       
2008 HC08C00468 2 HTC Corp. Dataquill Ltd. Revocation Settled 
 HC08C02525 1 Nokia 
Nokia Germany 
Gmbh 
Nokia UK Ltd. 
IPcom Gmbh Revocation Revoked 
       
 HC08C02526 1 Nokia Germany 
Gmbh 
IPcom Gmbh Revocation Settled 
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 HC08C02527 1 Nokia Germany 
Gmbh 
IPcom Gmbh Revocation Settled 
 HC08C02528 1 Nokia Germany 
Gmbh 
IPcom Gmbh Revocation Settled 
 HC08C02530 1 Nokia Germany 
Gmbh 
IPcom Gmbh Revocation Settled 
 HC08C04704 7 Tip Comm’ns  
LLC 
Motorola Ltd. Infringement Settled 
2009 HC09C00090 2 HTC Corp. Yozmot 33 Ltd Revocation Revoked 
 HC09C04868 1 Nokia Germany 
Gmbh 
IPcom Gmbh Revocation Revoked 


















       
 HC10C02090 7 Sandvik Intell. 








       
 HC10C04270 3 Shire Pharma. 
Contracts Ltd. 
Mount Sinai 
Sch. of Med. 
of N.Y. Univ. 
Revocation Settled 
              
Notes:
NPEs marked in bold 
ʶYear refers to the year in which the lawsuit was initiated (filing of claim form) 
* Pending EPO opposition (eventually revoked by EPO) 
ˣ Sandisk took a license from SISVEL 
NPE types: 1 IP Licensing Company, Acquired Patents; 2 IP Licensing Company, Owned by Inventor; 3 University o
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